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I. INTRODUCTION
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,1 a badly fractured United States
Supreme Court2 in 2009 narrowly upheld the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC or Commission) recent change and decision in its

1. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
2. Justice Antonin Scalia authored the opinion of the Court, with the exception of
Part III-E, which is a response to the arguments set forth in the dissenting opinions. Id.
at 1805–19. Justice Clarence Thomas offered a concurring opinion that agreed with the
result but questioned the viability of two prior U.S. Supreme Court opinions—Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978)—that, respectively, provide the precedent, in the face of First Amendment
concerns, for giving the FCC the power to closely regulate broadcasting and to punish
broadcast indecency. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1819–22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Anthony Kennedy issued an opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in which he emphasized that when a government agency, like the FCC, makes
a sudden shift in policy, the “decision to change course may be arbitrary and capricious
if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings without reasoned
explanation for doing so,” and that “[a]n agency cannot simply disregard contrary or
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can ignore
inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.” Id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that both emphasized the High
Court’s narrow treatment and ruling on indecency in Pacifica Foundation and criticized
the FCC for adopting “an interpretation of ‘indecency’ that bears no resemblance to what
Pacifica contemplated.” Id. at 1827–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
issued a dissenting opinion in which she not only found that the FCC’s decision to
change its indecency policy was arbitrary and capricious, but that also emphasized “that
there is no way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the
Commission has done. Today’s decision does nothing to diminish that shadow.” Id. at
1828 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Stephen Breyer issued a dissenting opinion
that was joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, as well as Justice David Souter, in
which Breyer found that the FCC
failed adequately to explain why it changed its indecency policy from a policy
permitting a single “fleeting use” of an expletive, to a policy that made no such
exception. Its explanation fails to discuss two critical factors, at least one of
which directly underlay its original policy decision. Its explanation instead
discussed several factors well known to it the first time around, which by
themselves provide no significant justification for a change of policy.
Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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indecency3 enforcement policy4 to punish broadcasters for the isolated
airing of fleeting expletives in time periods that fall outside of the
Commission’s designated safe-harbor time period.5 In doing so, the
High Court deftly dodged the First Amendment6 question about the
constitutionality of targeting such expression7 and instead based its
decision on the administrative law question of whether the FCC’s change
in policy was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).8
This Article concentrates on one particular issue raised in the Fox
Television Stations ruling—the critical question of causation of harm
caused by mass media messages and, in particular, the quantum of
evidentiary proof needed by a federal agency to demonstrate causation
sufficient to justify restricting the speech in question. The issue is ripe
for review, given the following statement by Justice Antonin Scalia in
the opinion of the Court in Fox Television Stations:

3. Federal law provides the FCC with the statutory authority to regulate “obscene,
indecent, or profane language.” 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). The FCC today defines indecent
speech as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory organs or activities.” Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Consumer Facts:
Obscene, Indecent, and Profane Broadcasts, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.
html (last visited July 25, 2010).
4. See generally JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, BROADCAST AND INTERNET
INDECENCY: DEFINING FREE SPEECH (2008) (providing a comprehensive review of the
FCC’s enforcement policies targeting broadcast indecency).
5. The notion of a safe-harbor zone
refers to the time period between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., local time. During this time
period, a station may air indecent and/or profane material. In contrast, there is no
“safe harbor” for the broadcast of obscene material. Obscene material is entitled
to no First Amendment protection, and may not be broadcast at any time.
Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Frequently Asked Questions: Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html#TheLaw (last visited July 25, 2010).
6. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated eightyfive years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to state
and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
7. Justice Scalia wrote that “[w]e decline to address the constitutional questions
at this time.” Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1819.
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (allowing courts to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are determined to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
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There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled,
and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One
cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children are intentionally
exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency), and
others are shielded from all indecency. . . . Here it suffices to know that
children mimic the behavior they observe—or at least the behavior that is
presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming replete with oneword indecent expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) oneword indecent expletives. Congress has made the determination that indecent
material is harmful to children, and has left enforcement of the ban to the
Commission. If enforcement had to be supported by empirical data, the ban would
effectively be a nullity.9

This line of logic, this Article argues, embraces certain assumptions
about media effects and, ultimately, provides the FCC with a nearly
evidentiary-free pass on a question of causation of harm that affects the
ability of both minors and adults to hear First Amendment-protected
speech.10 This is particularly troubling because Justice Scalia went on to
point out that, in the High Court’s seminal indecency decision in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,11 the FCC similarly “had adduced no quantifiable
measure of the harm caused by the language.”12
Despite this evidentiary absence, the Pacifica Foundation Court
nonetheless upheld the Commission’s ability to regulate indecency,
against a First Amendment challenge, in the name of protecting
children.13 The High Court in Pacifica Foundation did not consider any
social science evidence of harm to children allegedly caused by
expletives; it simply made the passing observation that “Pacifica’s
broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant.”14
Justice Scalia thus reasoned in Fox Television Stations that “[i]f the
Constitution itself demands of agencies no more scientifically certain
criteria to comply with the First Amendment, neither does the

9. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1813.
10. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
173, 178 (1996) (observing that “[u]nlike obscenity, the Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals have held that indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment. But,
because indecency deals with sexual matters, courts also have held that the government
may regulate it in certain circumstances.”); Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, How Far Is Too
Far? The Line Between “Offensive” and “Indecent” Speech, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 327,
332 (1997) (writing that although “indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment,” the
FCC nonetheless may channel it “to times when children are less likely to be in the audience”).
11. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
12. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1813 (emphasis added).
13. See Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting
that the FCC’s “primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching the ears of
unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that hour”).
14. Id. at 749 (majority opinion).
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Administrative Procedure Act to comply with the requirement of reasoned
decisionmaking.”15
The italicized portion of this statement and its interpretation of
Pacifica Foundation should be highly disturbing for free speech
advocates. It suggests that once a federal agency is vested with statutory
authority from Congress to regulate a particular category of speech, the
agency then is free to make decisions and adopt policies that censor that
particular type of speech without having to offer any evidence that the
speech actually causes harm. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent
in Fox Television Stations, the FCC offered “no empirical (or other)
evidence”16 regarding harm caused by hearing a fleeting expletive, and
in fact, it failed to address “relevant empirical studies that suggest the
contrary.”17 This directly conflicts with an earlier High Court ruling
that, in order to avoid a determination that a policy decision is arbitrary
and capricious, an “agency must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action.”18
The FCC’s new fleeting-expletive indecency policy, of course, could
still be struck down on First Amendment grounds that, as noted earlier,
the Court did not address in 2009 in Fox Television Stations.19 Those
constitutional reasons, however, certainly will not relate to the lack of
proof of causation of harm. After Justice Scalia’s twin assertions—that
the Constitution does not demand that an agency offer “more scientifically
certain criteria to comply with the First Amendment”20 and that “there
are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is
one of them”21—the question of proof of harm caused by broadcast
profanity was effectively removed from the judicial table. Oral argument
on remand from the Supreme Court took place before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in January 2010.22

15. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1814 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. Id.
18. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
19. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1814.
21. Id. at 1813.
22. See Larry Neumeister, Appeals Judges Mock “Fleeting Expletives” Policy,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 14, 2010, available at LexisNexis Academic news database.
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Part II of this Article begins by unpacking Justice Scalia’s statements
in Fox Television Stations regarding causation of harm and exploring
them, in interdisciplinary fashion,23 with research from multiple fields.24
It also suggests how Justice Scalia’s analysis begs the legal system for a
greater infusion of research from social science fields, including, but not
limited to, communication and media effects.25 Next, Part III contextualizes
the causation issue within a much broader framework, illustrating how
Justice Scalia’s remarks demonstrate the doctrinal inconsistency and
judicial incoherence on speech-related questions of both causation and
redress of harm in areas of law other than indecency, namely, with laws
targeting violent video games, commercial speech, and trademark.26
Finally, Part IV concludes by contending that Justice Scalia’s assertion in
Fox Television Stations that “[t]here are some propositions for which
scant empirical evidence can be marshaled”27 creates what the authors
call a harm causation gap that provides courts with substantial legal
leeway to speculate about which speech-harm “propositions”28 those are
and, in turn, to determine which laws affecting free speech are given merely
cursory review on the question of causation of harm.29 In addition, Part
IV speculates about the extent to which the target of the alleged harm
caused by fleeting expletives—namely, children, rather than adults—
might influence legal standards on the proof of causation of harm.
II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S RULING ON CAUSATION OF HARM AND THE
OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
THAT IT OPENS
This part of the Article has two sections. Section A analyzes the topic
of causation of harm allegedly caused by fleeting expletives like those
that were at issue in Fox Television Stations. Section B then suggests
the relevance and possible importance of communication research in
contributing to legal discussions and analyses on harm causation, given
the statements of Justice Scalia in the case.
23. Such an interdisciplinary approach may prove useful because, as Stanford Law
School Professor Deborah Rhode writes in a damning indictment of legal scholarship,
“Much interdisciplinary work that was initially of little interest to lawyers and judges has
in fact reshaped the legal landscape.” Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1327, 1338 (2002).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See infra Part III.
27. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1813.
28. Id.
29. See infra Part IV.
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A. The Analysis of Causation of Harm in Fox Television Stations
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling in Fox Television
Stations, the evidentiary battle in the case over causation of harm caused
by fleeting expletives erupted before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.30 In the process of concluding in 2007 “that the
FCC’s new policy regarding ‘fleeting expletives’ is arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act,”31 the appellate court observed
that the FCC’s decision to start targeting fleeting expletives was:
devoid of any evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful, let alone
establishes that this harm is serious enough to warrant government regulation.
Such evidence would seem to be particularly relevant today when children likely
hear this language far more often from other sources than they did in the 1970s
when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech.32

Put more bluntly, the Second Circuit found that the FCC failed to
demonstrate there even was an actual problem—an actual harm—that its
new enforcement policy would remedy.33 The FCC offered no proof of
either causation of harm from hearing fleeting expletives or even a
positive correlation34 showing that an increase in fleeting expletives on
the airwaves is associated with an increase in the use of those expletives
by minors. Even the existence of one study purporting to show causation
here would not, of course, advance the debate too far because “a causal
relationship cannot be proven by one study. If the evidence from

30. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129
S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
31. Id. at 447.
32. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
33. See id. (“The Commission has similarly failed to explain how its current policy
would remedy the purported ‘problem’ or to point to supporting evidence.”).
34. A correlation is
[a]n empirical relationship between two variables such that (1) changes in one
are associated with changes in the other or (2) particular attributes of one variable
are associated with particular attributes of the other. Correlation in and of itself
does not constitute a causal relationship between the two variables, but it is one
criterion of causality.
EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 90 (11th ed. 2007). A positive
correlation, in turn, “means that two variables move, or change, in the same direction . . . . If
one variable goes up, the other tends to also; if it goes down, the other does too.” LAWRENCE
R. FREY ET AL., INVESTIGATING COMMUNICATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH METHODS
357 (2d ed. 2000).
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numerous studies all supports a causal relationship, we can have more
faith that such a relationship exists.”35
The seemingly high level of scrutiny paid by the Second Circuit to the
causation of harm question, however, virtually evaporated into the
rarified judicial atmosphere when the case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court. In particular, Justice Scalia’s remarks regarding causation of
harm quoted in Part I36 need to be examined more carefully in order to
understand both the assumptions they embrace and the questions they
raise. Those statements are addressed separately below, in step-by-step
fashion. Importantly, the purpose of this section is not to definitively
resolve the causation questions raised regarding fleeting expletives—a
task far beyond the scope of this Article—but is to illustrate potential
flaws and problems with Justice Scalia’s logic and reasoning regarding
the aspect of causation.
1. Assertion No. 1: “There are some propositions for which scant empirical
evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast
profanity on children is one of them.”37
This sentence provided the entrée for Justice Scalia’s discussion
about proof of harm. The initial quartet of related questions raised by
it is as follows.
Is it really true that empirical evidence of the supposedly harmful
effect of broadcast profanity on children cannot be marshaled? Justice
Scalia seems to simply assume that empirical evidence is not possible or
that only scant evidence can be found. Is this the case? Does Justice
Scalia mean causational evidence when he employs the term empirical
evidence, or does he mean something else, perhaps more broadly in the
sense of quantitative evidence, as opposed to qualitative or cultural?
What he possibly means by empirical evidence is addressed later in
more detail in Section A.38
What exactly is the supposedly harmful effect on children about which
the FCC and the Court are concerned? Is it psychological damage to
minors? Is it an erosion of their morals or values? Or is it the mere fact
that they might learn and repeat the isolated and fleeting words they hear
uttered on television, assuming, of course, they have not previously
heard the words before? Without specification and explication of the
35.

David H. Weaver, Basic Statistical Tools, in MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
147, 161 (Guido H. Stempel III et al. eds., 2003).
Supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.

AND THEORY

36.
37.
38.
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precise harm that minors allegedly suffer, it is impossible to know
whether social science, communication research, or both might exist—or
could be generated—to help lawmakers and judges better understand if
there really is either a correlational or a causal relationship.
Why does Justice Scalia frame the issue of harm so broadly? In particular,
he frames the issue as the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on
children when, in fact, the FCC policy change before the Court dealt far
more narrowly and precisely with the supposedly harmful effect of
hearing isolated and fleeting expletives on children. In other words, the
real question would seem to be whether children are harmed, whatever
“harm” that might be, by hearing one or two passing expletives during
the course of a live broadcast of a two-hour awards show.39 Or, perhaps,
the real question might be whether exposure over time—for instance, to
five or six shows per year that include such ephemeral and fleeting
expletives—causes harm.
When Justice Scalia uses the term children, to what age is he referring?
Who, in other words, is the mythical, hypothetical child against whom
the FCC and courts will evaluate both the harm and suitability of
television programming? Is Justice Scalia suggesting that the same
alleged harm would occur for an infant, as it would for a six-year-old
boy or a sixteen-year-old girl? Is he lumping all minors of all ages and
both genders in together as children? This is very important because, as
an article in Developmental Psychology observed, “several researchers
have reported that young children seem to recall more of the visual than
the auditory (mainly verbal) components of television programs.”40 On
the other hand, it is true that “[p]reschool-aged children learn vocabulary
and concepts from educational television.”41

39. The Fox Television Stations case pivoted on the use of unscripted expletives by
celebrities Cher and Nicole Richie during, respectively, the 2002 and 2003 Billboard
Music Awards shows. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1808.
40. Cynthia Hoffner & Joanne Cantor, Developmental Differences in Responses to
a Television Character’s Appearance and Behavior, 21 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
1065, 1065 (1985) (emphasis added). See Diane E. Field & Daniel R. Anderson,
Instruction and Modality Effects on Children’s Television Attention and Comprehension,
77 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 91, 97–98 (1985) (“[O]lder children are more likely to process the
audio at a semantic level without looking.”).
41. Georgene L. Troseth, TV Guide: Two-Year-Old Children Learn To Use Video
as a Source of Information, 39 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 140, 140 (2003).
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2. Assertion No. 2: “One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study,
in which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent
broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency),
and others are shielded from all indecency.”42
Justice Scalia’s initial assumption here certainly is well taken. It is
highly unlikely that the human subjects committee or institutional
review board (IRB)43 of any department, college, or university would
approve a study that exposes children—however old or young they may
be—to words like shit, cunt, and fuck, 44 largely because “[a] central
responsibility of IRBs is to ensure that the potential benefits to the
individual research participants (and to society) will be greater than any
risks that may be encountered by participation in the research.”45 On top
of this, of course, parents would need to consent to have their children
participate in such a study or experiment.
But Justice Scalia’s hypothetical of a controlled study, of course, is
merely an extreme example he uses to illustrate what is not possible. It
does not mean that surveys, field studies, or other forms of communication
or psychology research cannot be, or have not already been, conducted
regarding the possible impact of profanity, be it broadcast or interpersonal,
on minors.
There already exists, in fact, much scholarly literature from different
fields on profanity and swearing that might, in the future, help both
courts and the FCC to gain a much better understanding of this speech
phenomenon.46 As Brigham Young University Professor Dale Cressman

42. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1813.
43. See generally Stephen J. Ceci et al., Human Subjects Review, Personal Values,
and the Regulation of Social Science Research, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 994, 994 (1985)
(describing “the role played by human subjects committees (or institutional review
boards—IRBs for short) in the regulation of research,” noting that “[o]ften, the first step
(a required one in most cases) in undertaking research is to obtain the approval of one’s
IRB for the proposed treatment of human subjects,” and pointing out that, among other
factors, IRBs consider the physical and mental risks of proposed studies).
44. The seven words used by comedian George Carlin during the radio broadcast
that gave rise to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pacifica Foundation were “shit, piss,
fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.” See Christine A. Corcos, George Carlin,
Constitutional Law Scholar, 37 STETSON L. REV. 899, 911 (2008) (citing these words and
providing “part of Carlin’s Seven Filthy Words monologue in which he critiqued the
FCC’s policy by using some of the words he thought the agency would ban”).
45. Ralph L. Rosnow et al., The Institutional Review Board as a Mirror of Scientific
and Ethical Standards, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 821, 822 (1993).
46. A number of relatively recent books address profanity, swearing, or cursing, or
all three. See, e.g., KEITH ALLAN & KATE BURRIDGE, FORBIDDEN WORDS: TABOO AND
THE CENSORING OF LANGUAGE (2006); GEOFFREY HUGHES, SWEARING: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF FOUL LANGUAGE, OATHS AND PROFANITY IN ENGLISH (1991); TIMOTHY JAY,
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and his colleagues write in a 2009 article, “Research on profanity is not
confined to the field of communication. Sociologists, psychologists, and
pediatricians are among those contributing to the academic literature on
the nature, social uses, and effects of profanity—both in the media and
in everyday life.”47
For instance, more than 100 years ago, The Psychological Review
published an article titled The Psychology of Profanity48 that suggested
the beneficial use of swearing as “a safety-valve”49 because “if the man
did not swear, he would do something worse. It may be likened to the
engine blowing off steam.”50 First Amendment scholars will recognize
how this comports with the safety-valve function in free speech for
which it is theorized “that tolerance of radical speech diminished the
likelihood of radical action.”51 The radical speech that is swearing
within many circles of society allows a person to blow off verbal steam.
What is most striking about this, of course, is that it completely
contradicts the underlying, fundamental assumption embraced by the
FCC in its indecency policy that profanity and swearing are necessarily
bad things. Communication researchers like Daniel Linz of the University
of California, Santa Barbara have built up healthy publication records
testing and challenging similar assumptions by the legal system about
media effects or effects associated with businesses that distribute First
Amendment-protected materials.52

CURSING IN AMERICA: A PSYCHOLINGUISTIC STUDY OF DIRTY LANGUAGE IN THE COURTS,
IN THE MOVIES, IN THE SCHOOLYARDS AND ON THE STREETS (1992); RUTH WAJNRYB,
EXPLETIVE DELETED: A GOOD LOOK AT BAD LANGUAGE (2005). In addition to the other
scholarly articles discussed later in this part of the Article, there are others on the topic,
including some very old ones. See, e.g., Edward C. Echols, The Art of Classical Swearing, 46
CLASSICAL J. 291 (1951); Edwin P. Whipple, The Swearing Habit, 140 N. AM. REV. 536
(1885).
47. Dale L. Cressman et al., Swearing in the Cinema: An Analysis of Profanity in
U.S. Teen-Oriented Movies, 1980–2006, 3 J. CHILD. & MEDIA 117, 119 (2009).
48. G.T.W. Patrick, The Psychology of Profanity, 8 PSYCHOL. REV. 113 (1901).
49. Id. at 119.
50. Id.
51. Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s “First
Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 609 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Daniel Linz et al., An Examination of the Assumption that Adult
Businesses Are Associated with Crime in Surrounding Areas: A Secondary Effects Study
in Charlotte, North Carolina, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 69 (2004); Daniel Linz et al.,
Testing Legal Assumptions Regarding the Effects of Dancer Nudity and Proximity to
Patron on Erotic Expression, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (2000); Bryant Paul & Daniel
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In 2009, Professor Timothy Jay published an article in Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law called Do Offensive Words Harm People?53 in
which he boldly contended that “[a]sserting that offensive words
universally cause harm cannot be justiﬁed.”54 Professor Jay’s work, in
bridging psychology and law, takes the FCC to task in somewhat
blistering fashion, arguing that:
Judicial reasoning in Paciﬁca is based on the Justices’ folk knowledge
of offensiveness but not on any scientiﬁc evidence of harm from indecent
speech. . . . There is no psychological evidence of harm from ﬂeeting expletives.
In the end, it appears that the FCC remains out of touch with millions of
speakers, and with meaningful linguistic analyses of swearing in public, to
impose its own notion on propriety on all of us. Unsupported beliefs about
indecency are not unlike those underlying our approach to sexuality education
in public schools.55

Professor Jay notes that, during his research, he and his colleagues
have “recorded hundreds of incidences of children saying offensive
words in public and private places,”56 thus “making suspect assumptions
that children are corrupted by ﬂeeting expletives that they already know and
use.”57 He concludes that “courts need to abandon inaccurate commonsense
views of offensive speech and be more open to expert testimony and
scientiﬁc evidence regarding the nature of offensive words.”58
In a different article, Professor Jay argues that “[t]he negative framing
of swearing reinforces the notion of taboo words as substandard speech
and is used by authority figures to relegate swearing to bad behavior that
cannot be condoned.”59 In the case of indecency, the authors of this
Article contend that the FCC is such an authority figure and that it has
engaged in such a negative framing of certain language in order to promote
and enhance its authority over broadcast indecency. Children are arguably
being used, in other words, by the FCC to perpetuate and instantiate its
authority over society’s use of language in the broadcast medium.

G. Linz, The Effects of Exposure to Virtual Child Pornography on Viewer Cognitions
and Attitudes Toward Deviant Sexual Behavior, 35 COMM. RES. 3 (2008).
53. Timothy Jay, Do Offensive Words Harm People?, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 81 (2009).
54. Id. at 89.
55. Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 94.
59. Timothy Jay, The Utility and Ubiquity of Taboo Words, 4 PERSP. PSYCHOL.
SCI. 153, 157 (2009).
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3. Assertion No. 3: “Here it suffices to know that children mimic
the behavior they observe—or at least the behavior that is
presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming
replete with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce
children who use (at least) one-word indecent expletives.”60
The primary questions raised by Justice Scalia’s assertions here are
as follows.
Do children necessarily mimic behavior they observe that appears to
be normal and appropriate? Put differently, will hearing expletives on
television programs tend to cause children to use them?
Is Justice Scalia, and, in turn, the FCC, concerned merely with shortterm mimicry—he uses the word mimic61—or is he concerned with longterm observational learning from television? There are critical differences
between the two, although this may simply have been a careless use of
language by the Justice.62
Is the alleged harm from the broadcast of fleeting expletives the mere
later use of those words by minors, rather than some deeper psychological
scarring or emotional injury?
With his first sentence in the quotation immediately above, Justice
Scalia begins to tap into social learning theory that, as communication
scholars Jennings Bryant and Susan Thompson write, places “much
emphasis on the concept of observational learning. A person observes
other people’s actions and the consequences of those actions, and learns
from what has been observed. The learned behavior can then be reenacted

60. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
61. Id.
62. Jodi L. Whitaker and Brad J. Bushman explain the difference this way in a recent
law journal article:
Mimicry is the short-term copying of the actions of others. In contrast, observational
learning refers to “the process through which behavioral scripts, world schemas,
and normative beliefs become encoded in a [person]’s mind simply as a
consequence of the [person] observing others.” Whereas short-term mimicry
needs only one exposure to the observed behavior for children to imitate the
action, long-term observational learning usually requires repeated exposure or
repeated rehearsal.
Jodi L. Whitaker & Brad J. Bushman, A Review of the Effects of Violent Video Games on
Children and Adolescents, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033, 1044 (2009) (alterations
in original).
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by the observer.”63 Justice Scalia also is correct that television can
influence what children learn, as Professors Barry Sapolsky and Barbara
Kaye note:
Television is one of many socialization agents. Although television violence
studies are mixed on the effects of viewing violence, it is well documented that
television is very influential and shapes our views of the world and our behaviors,
including gender roles. Social learning theory explains that behaviors we view
most often and those that are easy to imitate tend to be the most influential.64

Justice Scalia’s second sentence—that if children hear expletives on
television programming, they will tend to use them—is relatively
remarkable because it is reminiscent of the outdated hypodermic needle
model of mass communication effects in which audience members, as
communication researchers Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard,
Jr., note, were perceived as “vulnerable targets easily influenced by mass
communication messages.”65 Although this theory, sometimes known as
the bullet theory, “is clearly a view held by members of the public at
various times,”66 it has been rejected by communication researchers who
see a much more complex communication process under which “there
are a number of different dependent variables that can be examined in
the quest for possible effects of mass communication.”67 Indeed, children
are not inert viewers of television; Gordon Berry of the University of
California, Los Angeles, for instance, contends that “for the child[,]
television viewing is not the passive and stuporlike activity many have
characterized it to be.”68 The impact of television viewing on minors is
much more complex than a bullet-like effect.69
63. JENNINGS BRYANT & SUSAN THOMPSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDIA EFFECTS
70 (2002).
64. Barry S. Sapolsky & Barbara K. Kaye, The Use of Offensive Language by
Men and Women in Prime Time Television Entertainment, 13 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 292,
295 (2005).
65. WERNER J. SEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR., COMMUNICATION THEORIES:
ORIGINS, METHODS, AND USES IN THE MASS MEDIA 18 (5th ed. 2001).
66. Id. at 13.
67. Id.
68. Gordon L. Berry, Developing Children and Multicultural Attitudes: The
Systemic Psychosocial Influences of Television Portrayals in a Multimedia Society, 9
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 360, 362 (2003).
69. Brian R. Clifford and his co-authors assert:
[T]hat a knowledge of the interactions among media components and content,
viewer variables such as perception, evaluation and motivation, together with
cognitive capabilities, and characteristics of different viewing and viewer
backgrounds are essential components in the effort to understand the child’s
television experience and the impact of that experience upon them.
BRIAN R. CLIFFORD ET AL., TELEVISION AND CHILDREN: PROGRAM EVALUATION,
COMPREHENSION, AND IMPACT 227 (1995).
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Thus, although children conceivably might learn a new expletive from
watching and listening to a television program, especially given “the
well-documented ability of preschoolers to learn vocabulary incidentally,”70
this does not necessarily mean that they will start using that word or
saying it as a regular part of their vocabulary. In particular, social cognitive
theory suggests that “outcome expectancies”71 will influence whether a
behavior is enacted. If a child knows that his parents72 will punish him
for using certain offensive words, this may dissuade him from using
them.73 This is particularly important because “[t]elevision viewing
occurs in an ecological context of the family”74 and, in particular, “[f]or
children under age 7, most viewing of general audience programs occurs
with an adult, usually a parent.”75 These general-audience programs would
seem to be the types of programs, as compared to educational ones like
Sesame Street in which a fleeting expletive might occur, and a parent
thus has the opportunity to instruct the child as the parent sees fit about
the use of such language.
Stanford University’s Albert Bandura contends that “[t]he ability to
envision the likely outcomes of prospective actions is another way in
which anticipatory mechanisms regulate human motivation and action.
People strive to gain anticipated beneficial outcomes and to forestall
aversive ones.”76 Bandura thus stresses that “[s]ocial cognitive theory

70. JUDITH VAN EVRA, TELEVISION AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 45 (1990).
71. See Gerald M. Devins, Social Cognitive Analysis of Recovery from a Lapse
After Smoking Cessation: Comment on Haaga and Stewart (1992), 60 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 29, 29 (1992) (“An outcome expectation has been defined as one’s
estimate that a given behavior can produce a particular outcome.”).
72. See Brian L. Thorn & Lucia A. Gilbert, Antecedents of Work and Family Role
Expectations of College Men, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 259, 260 (1998) (“It is clear that
parents are in a position to impart a great deal of influence on the learning and
socialization process . . . .”).
73. This holds true for other types of behavior engaged in by minors. For instance,
“[a] growing body of literature supports the strength of alcohol-related expectancies as
important determinants of adolescent drinking behavior.” Lawrence M. Scheier & Gilbert
J. Botvin, Expectancies as Mediators of the Effects of Social Influences and Alcohol
Knowledge on Adolescent Alcohol Use: A Prospective Analysis, 11 PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE
BEHAVS. 48, 48 (1997).
74. Aletha C. Huston et al., From Attention to Comprehension: How Children
Watch and Learn from Television, in CHILDREN AND TELEVISION: FIFTY YEARS OF
RESEARCH 41, 46 (Norma Pecora et al. eds., 2007).
75. Id.
76. Albert Bandura, Human Agency in Social Cognitive Theory, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1175, 1180 (1989).
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distinguishes between acquisition and performance because people do
not perform everything they learn.”77 The bottom line is that “whether
observers actually engage in that learned behavior is a function of the
reinforcement contingencies (positive or negative) they associate with it.”78
It is important to notice here that Justice Scalia still has not identified
the specific harm that justifies regulating fleeting expletives, other than
the assertion that children will “use”79 them. Is he suggesting that mere
use of an expletive is, in and of itself, a harm to the child? If it is the
harm, it can easily be cured.80 One study published in 1978, for instance,
focused on an eleven-year-old boy named Mark who “would swear
profusely at the dinner table.”81 The study found that:
Mark’s swearing behavior could be rapidly and considerably decreased if that
behavior resulted in his having to wash windows. It appears that washing windows,
combined with the threat of loss of privileges if the window washing was not
completed, was indeed a sufficiently potent aversive stimulus for Mark to learn
quickly to avoid it by decreasing his swearing behavior.82

Moreover, if the only alleged harm is the mere use of expletives by
minors, is it not the prerogative of parents—not the government—to
either praise or punish their children’s use of language? Indeed, some
parents may not object to their children using expletives, just as they
also might not object to allowing their minors to hear an occasional
expletive on a television program rather than shielding them in an
expletive-free, televised bubble that does not reflect the growing use of
profanity in the real world.83 It is useful to recall here the words of the

77. Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Mass Communication, in MEDIA
EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 61, 68–69 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf
Zillmann eds., 1994) (emphasis added).
78. STANLEY J. BARAN & DENNIS K. DAVIS, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS, FERMENT, AND FUTURE 185 (5th ed. 2009) (italics and bold emphasis omitted).
79. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
80. See Ashton D. Trice & Frank C. Parker, Decreasing Adolescent Swearing in
an Instructional Setting, 6 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 29, 29 (1983) (reporting the
results of a study in which “the use of obscene words by two adolescents was reduced using
feedback with social reinforcement and response cost procedures in an instructional setting”).
81. Joel Fischer & Robert Nehs, Use of a Commonly Available Chore To Reduce a
Boy’s Rate of Swearing, 9 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 81, 81 (1978).
82. Id. at 82.
83. See generally Melanie B. Glover, Youth Swearing a Curse on the Rise, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 2, 2008, at C12 (describing an increase in adolescent swearing, and quoting
one expert for the proposition that the “average adolescent uses roughly 80 to 90 swear
words a day”); Laura McFarland, What the %&$@—For Some Kids, Potty Training
Includes Word Choice, ROCKY MOUNT TELEGRAM (N.C.), Apr. 27, 2008, at Sunday Life
(quoting a clinical psychologist for the proposition that “there is an increase in the
pervasiveness of inappropriate language”).
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late Justice William Brennan, dissenting in the seminal indecency case
of Pacifica Foundation, who opined:
[P]arents, not the government, have the right to make certain decisions regarding the
upbringing of their children. As surprising as it may be to individual Members
of this Court, some parents may actually find Mr. [George] Carlin’s unabashed
attitude towards the seven “dirty words” healthy, and deem it desirable to expose
their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding
the words. Such parents may constitute a minority of the American public, but the
absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their children in
this fashion does not alter the right’s nature or its existence. Only the Court’s
regrettable decision does that.84

Finally, if the use of bad words is the harm on which Justice Scalia
was focused, then both he and the FCC ignore literature suggesting the
value of swearing, even including among minors. Professor Vivian de
Klerk, a linguist, writes that “swearing is one of the many ways in which
members of groups can reflect their informality and modernity, ensuring
that they are seen as ‘cool,’ fashionable, up-to-date and part of the
speech community of young people, while at the same time distinguishing
themselves as members of a distinctive peer group.”85 She asserts that
expletives “are prime symbolic assets”86 in the speech marketplace of
minors, “carrying markedly higher value during the adolescent years
than in later years.”87
The use of offensive words by minors thus has its benefits within their
peer-group worlds and as they attempt to carve out their own identities.
First Amendment scholars will note how this comports with the selfrealization theory of freedom of expression.88 As the late Justice Thurgood
Marshall once wrote:
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of
the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an
integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress

84. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
85. Vivian de Klerk, Slang and Swearing as Markers of Inclusion and Exclusion in
Adolescence, in TALKING ADOLESCENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNICATION IN THE
TEENAGE YEARS 111, 112 (Angie Williams & Crispin Thurlow eds., 2005).
86. Id. at 116.
87. Id.
88. See R. George Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy
Commercial Speech, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 137, 153 (1994) (identifying “the development
and flourishing of the personality” as the goal of the “self-realization” theory of free
expression).
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expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the
individual’s worth and dignity.89

If minors actually do learn expletives from the fleeting ones they hear
on television programs rather than from other sources, such as their
peers, parents, or music, there is no evidence to show that their usage is,
standing alone, harmful. The use of swearwords on occasion, studies show,
can even enhance one’s perceived credibility.90 In addition, a recent study
demonstrated that swearing can relieve physical pain.91 The law overlooks
such benefits and only assumes harms.
4. Assertion No. 4: “Congress has made the determination that indecent
material is harmful to children, and has left enforcement of the
ban to the Commission. If enforcement had to be supported by
empirical data, the ban would effectively be a nullity.”92
These two sentences raise three key questions.
Is Justice Scalia suggesting that once Congress decides that a
particular form of media content is harmful to audience members, and in
turn, once it delegates the creation and enforcement of regulations
designed to stop such harms to a federal agency, then no “empirical”
data evidencing harm is needed to justify its regulation? Alternatively,
does this no-data-required determination only apply to those areas where
the type of longitudinal, controlled studies to which he also referred93 are
not possible?
What does Justice Scalia mean by empirical data? By definition,
“[e]mpirical research often is associated with systematic scientific
methodology based on observation and fact-based interpretation and
frequently is contrasted with normative, or philosophical and value
judgmental, research that empirical researchers often regard as anecdotal
and unsystematic, which is more common in the humanities.”94 As a 1987
89. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring),
overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 411 (1989).
90. Eric Rassin & Simone van der Heijden, Appearing Credible? Swearing Helps!,
11 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 177, 181 (2005).
91. See William Hageman, Pain Relief You Can Swear by, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Sept. 1, 2009, at 37 (describing the study in which university students were each
“asked to put his or her hand in 32-degree water for as long as possible. When repeating
their favorite profanity—at an even volume and pace—the students were able to keep
their hand in the water for an average of 155 seconds, 40 seconds longer than when they
did it without swearing”).
92. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
93. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
94. Mack C. Shelley, Empiricism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP
AND ADMINISTRATION 337, 337 (Fenwick W. English ed., 2006).
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article in Law and Contemporary Problems suggested, “any product of
observation or experiment might be called empirical.”95
Rather than empirical, does Scalia really mean the term scientific
method? The scientific method “involves steps beyond observation and
description. Specifically, these steps include development and testing of
explanations for patterns derived from observations.”96 In other words,
if empirical research merely means observational research for Justice
Scalia, then this is different from scientific data because “discovery and
documentation, rooted in observations and descriptions, do not comprise
the process commonly termed the scientific method. The ‘scientific
method’ depends on the generation and testing of scientific hypotheses,
which are defined as candidate explanations.”97
Is empirical data—whatever Justice Scalia meant by that—the only
type of evidence that courts should consider when evaluating issues of
harm caused by media messages, or are other types of research and
theory also relevant?
In summary, this section has not attempted to resolve the causation
issue related to fleeting expletives, but it has instead demonstrated that
the issue is far more complex than Justice Scalia makes it out to be with
his assumptions and assertions on the topic. It has also established that a
vast amount of research and theory related to expletives already exists
that both the FCC and the Court ignored while so quickly concluding—
if not assuming—that fleeting expletives must surely cause some
undefined and unidentified harm. By failing to identify the very harm in
question, both Justice Scalia and the FCC evade the possibility of
outside research contributing to the causation question.
B. Communication Research
Twenty years ago, Professors Jeremy Cohen and Timothy Gleason
called for “an interdisciplinary approach to communication and law”98
that would raise “basic questions about communication assumptions

95. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy
Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 196 n.3 (1987).
96. Guy R. McPherson, Scientific Method, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 888, 888 (Neil J. Salkind & Kristin Rasmussen eds., 2008).
97. Id.
98. JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION
AND LAW 13 (1990).
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inherent in law” and attempt “to find suitable means for identifying
those assumptions and for testing both their scientific and their legal
validity.”99 Now both deans at major research universities,100 Cohen and
Gleason lamented back in 1990, as assistant professors, what they
described as “a dearth of communication studies material that integrates
communication theory and law.”101 They contended, however, that “[a]
specific research agenda cannot be dictated”102 when it comes to “the
kinds of questions open to research under the heading of communication
and law.”103
Justice Scalia, the authors of this Article assert, actually handed
communication researchers a potential media-effects agenda when he
asserted that “[t]here are some propositions for which scant empirical
evidence can be marshaled.”104 When it comes to propositions relating
to the supposedly deleterious effects of speech and media messages on
minors, as well as adults, communication researchers can help the law
by doing the following.
Identifying and explaining the types of empirical evidence—
correlational? causational? survey? experimental? meta-analysis?105—
that actually can be marshaled on any given issue of harm that lawmakers
or agencies attribute to a type of media message. In other words, is it really
true, as Justice Scalia asserted, that the effect of profanity on minors is
one of those speech-harm propositions on which scant empirical evidence
either exists or could be generated? Communication researchers might be

99. Id. at 12.
100. Cohen is associate vice president and senior associate dean for undergraduate
education at the Pennsylvania State University. See Jeremy Cohen—College of
Communications, http://comm.psu.edu/people/jxc45 (last visited July 25, 2010). Gleason
is dean of the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon.
See Tim Gleason—School of Journalism and Communication, http://jcomm.uoregon.edu/
faculty-staff/tgleason (last visited July 25, 2010).
101. COHEN & GLEASON, supra note 98, at 113.
102. Id. at 134.
103. Id.
104. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009) (emphasis added).
105. University of Connecticut Psychology Professor Blair T. Johnson writes that:
Meta-analysis uses statistical techniques to summarize results from different
empirical studies on a given topic to learn more about that topic. In other words,
meta-analyses bring together the results of many different studies, although the
number of studies may be as small as two in some specialized contexts.
Because these quantitative reviews are analyses of analyses, they are literally
meta-analyses. The practice is also known as research synthesis, a term that
more completely encompasses the steps involved in conducting such a review.
Blair T. Johnson, Meta-Analysis, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 560, 560
(Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2007).
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able to help answer this question so that lawmakers and judges know
what type of evidence exists.
Filing amici curiae briefs that help to explain the meaning of the
relevant evidence that exists regarding the supposed impact of a particular
type of media message on those who are exposed to it. Significantly,
this already occurred on the question of whether violent video games
cause harm––a friend-of-the-court brief was filed by thirty-three scholars
from the fields of media, psychology, and culture106 in Interactive
Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County.107
Testifying before congressional hearings and state legislative bodies
when bills affecting First Amendment speech rights are put up for debate
before critical committees.
Creating research agendas around those topics of causation of harm with
which lawmakers are grappling, from violent video games to indecency
to restrictions targeting tobacco advertising.
In a 2009 law journal article, Professor Kimberlianne Podlas observed
that “much of the empirical research on television effects remains within
the fields of cognitive psychology and media studies. As a result, legal
scholars and practitioners have been slow to apply these insights to the
law.”108 But help from communication research can be important, as
communication scholars Michael Gurevitch, Stephen Coleman, and Jay
G. Blumler made clear in a 2009 article when they wrote that
“communication scholars can help policy makers to avoid some of the
more crass assumptions that misguided the earlier debates. Media
effects are not direct and undifferentiated.”109
None of this will be easy, however. As one of the authors of this
Article wrote in 2004, “The intersection of social science and the law has
long been controversial. The extent to which social scientific methods
and theoretical structures can or should contribute to the law has been

106. See Marjorie Heins, Introduction to Brief Amici Curiae of Thirty-Three Media
Scholars in St. Louis Video Games Case, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 419 (2002) (including the
complete text of the brief, as well as a description of it by one of its authors).
107. Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th
Cir. 2003).
108. Kimberlianne Podlas, Respect My Authority! South Park’s Expression of Legal
Ideology and Contribution to Legal Culture, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 491, 493–94
(2009).
109. Michael Gurevitch et al., Political Communication—Old and New Media
Relationships, 625 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 164, 177 (2009).
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contested in American legal thought since the early twentieth century.”110
When it comes to free speech questions, “translating social scientific
findings into the domain of existing First Amendment doctrine is a
daunting problem. It is one that scholars and judges must grapple with,
while doing their best to ensure that valuable First Amendment freedoms
are respected.”111
But the power of communication research could ultimately undo the
entire line of indecency regulation that flows from FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.112 As Professor Mehmet Konar-Steenberg wrote five years
ago in a law journal article, if judicial assumptions about media harms
are wrong, then:
[I]t becomes easier to argue that Pacifica was wrongly decided. Pacifica represents
an exception to the general First Amendment rule, and if it can be shown to be
based on unsubstantiated assumptions about mass communications effects, then
there is no demonstrated basis for departing from the default First Amendment
protections afforded to non-broadcast media. Second, it becomes possible to
affirmatively argue in favor of extending the highest level of First Amendment
protection to all media based on the empirically-demonstrable conclusion that
audiences actively use media.113

With this background in mind on both Justice Scalia’s statements
regarding causation of harm and fleeting expletives, as well as an
examination of the research and potential research related to the topic,
this Article next illustrates the judicial inconsistency that exists when it
comes to questions of speech and harm, depending upon either the topic
or subject matter.
III. JUDICIAL INCONSISTENCY AND INCOHERENCE ON CAUSATION OF
HARM FROM MEDIA MESSAGES
This part of the Article illustrates how the level of attention paid by
courts to the issue of harm allegedly caused by speech varies substantially,
depending on the type of speech at issue. As an examination, the
causation-of-harm question in each of the three different categories of
speech described below suggests, there is judicial inconsistency when it
comes to scrutinizing causation and demanding proof of harm. Section

110. Matthew D. Bunker & David K. Perry, Standing at the Crossroads: Social
Science, Human Agency and Free Speech Law, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2004).
111. Id. at 23.
112. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
113. Mehmet Konar-Steenberg, The Needle and the Damage Done: The Pervasive
Presence of Obsolete Mass Media Audience Models in First Amendment Doctrine, 8
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 68 (2005).
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A initially addresses laws targeting violent video games,114 while Section
B then analyzes evidentiary issues affecting causation and remedy of
harm in the commercial speech doctrine,115 and Section C finally focuses
on trademark law.116
A. Violent Video Games
Like the constitutionality of laws targeting indecency, statutes focusing
on violent video games are content-based laws117 and thus are subject to
the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.118 Moreover, both broadcast
indecency regulations and violent video game laws are aimed at protecting
minors from supposedly pernicious content.119
When it comes, however, to evaluating the constitutionality of regulations
designed to limit minors’ access to video games featuring violent images
and storylines, courts are uniformly rigorous on demanding evidentiary
proof of causation of harm. For instance, in its 2009 decision in Video

114. See infra Part III.A.
115. See infra Part III.B.
116. See infra Part III.C.
117. See generally Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that
Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus,
79 IND. L.J. 801, 803–06 (2004) (providing an excellent overview and analysis of the
sometimes slippery distinctions between content-neutral laws and content-based laws).
118. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(writing that a “content-based speech restriction” is permissible “only if it satisfies strict
scrutiny,” which requires that the law in question “be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
126 (1989) (“The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest.”). See generally E RWIN C HEMERINSKY ,
C ONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 903 (2d ed. 2002) (“[C]ontent-based
discrimination must meet strict scrutiny . . . .”).
119. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Precedent Be Damned—It’s All About
Good Politics & Sensational Soundbites: The Video Game Censorship Saga of 2005, 6
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 79, 128 (2005) (analyzing several ill-fated legislative attempts to
restrict minors’ access to violent video games, and asserting that “[t]he rhetoric behind all of
the legislation is decidedly child-centric, focusing on the need to protect innocent children
from alleged harms while simultaneously providing parents with the tools and ability to
do so”); Kevin W. Saunders, The Cost of Errors in the Debate over Media Harm to
Children, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 772 (“From concerns over comic books and crime
magazines in the 1950s, through concerns involving violent films, to recent concerns over
violent video games, the issue has been the same: whether these influences cause children
to become violent or otherwise injure them psychologically.” (emphasis added)).
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Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger,120 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit required California to offer “substantial
evidence”121 of the state’s “purported interest in preventing psychological
or neurological harm”122 to minors who play violent video games. The
Ninth Circuit not only engaged in its own examination and analysis of
several studies offered by California,123 but it suggested that proof of
harm causation—not merely correlation—was required when it wrote:
Nearly all of the research is based on correlation, not evidence of causation, and
most of the studies suffer from significant, admitted flaws in methodology as
they relate to the State’s claimed interest. None of the research establishes or
suggests a causal link between minors playing violent video games and actual
psychological or neurological harm, and inferences to that effect would not be
reasonable. In fact, some of the studies caution against inferring causation.
Although we do not require the State to demonstrate a “scientific certainty,” the
State must come forward with more than it has.124

Just one year before, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Swanson125 went even further
on the evidentiary burden in striking down a Minnesota law targeting
violent video games when it held “that the evidence falls short of
establishing the statistical certainty of causation demanded.”126 The
appellate court in Swanson somewhat chafed at the application of this
evidentiary standard, remarking that “[t]he requirement of such a high
level of proof may reflect a refined estrangement from reality.”127 The court
determined, however, that it had to apply it in light of precedent from an
earlier Eighth Circuit ruling in Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St.
Louis County128 that struck down a local ordinance targeting violent
video games. In Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, the Eighth Circuit
opined that St. Louis County, Missouri:
[M]ust come forward with empirical support for its belief that “violent” video games
cause psychological harm to minors. In this case, as we have already explained, the

120. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3627 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448).
121. Id. at 962 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).
122. Id. at 964.
123. See id. at 963–64 (critiquing research conducted by Dr. Craig Anderson and
Dr. Douglas Gentile).
124. Id. at 964 (emphasis added).
125. 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008).
126. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
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County has failed to present the “substantial supporting evidence” of harm that is
required before an ordinance that threatens protected speech can be upheld.129

The other federal appellate court to address the constitutionality of
laws affecting minors’ access to violent video games, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, also suggested the need for
“social scientific evidence”130 to support such measures. In rejecting the
studies offered by the city of Indianapolis, the Seventh Circuit reasoned:
There is no indication that the games used in the studies are similar to those in
the record of this case or to other games likely to be marketed in game arcades
in Indianapolis. The studies do not find that video games have ever caused anyone
to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused the
average level of violence to increase anywhere.131

At this point, the inconsistency on the question of causation should be
clear—laws targeting broadcast indecency and statutes centering on
violent video games both are content-based measures aimed at protecting
minors from the alleged harms of exposure to certain content, yet only
laws targeting violent video games are routinely subjected to a rigorous
evidentiary analysis on the issue of causation of harm.
B. Commercial Speech
Although somewhat inconsistently,132 courts working within commercial
speech jurisprudence133 in recent years, including the Supreme Court, are
taking greater care with the nature of the harm the government alleges,

129. Id. at 959.
130. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001).
131. Id. at 578–79.
132. University of North Carolina Professor Michael Hoefges, for instance,
observed in a 2003 article that “[t]he Supreme Court remains divided on how to apply
the Central Hudson analysis in commercial speech cases, especially when it comes to the
sufficiency of evidence needed to establish ‘direct advancement’ under the third factor
and ‘narrow tailoring’ under the fourth factor.” Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco
Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 267, 311 (2003) (second emphasis added).
133. The U.S. Supreme Court first gave constitutional protection to advertising in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). It concluded then that “commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected.”
Id. at 770. In reaching this decision, the High Court recognized the “consumer’s interest
in the free flow of commercial information.” Id. at 763. The Court also agreed that
“society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.” Id.
at 764.
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as well as the efficacy of the remedy proposed by the governmental
regulator.134 In this area of communications law, at least, courts increasingly
are demanding empirical evidence of some sort related to causation and
remedy of harm, rather than impressionistic guesswork or mere
speculation and conjecture, thus illustrating far less deference paid to
government action than is given to the FCC in the realm of indecency in
cases like Fox Television Stations.135
In commercial speech, the vehicle for this data-driven inquiry is the
so-called Central Hudson test, a modified form of intermediate scrutiny136
that was initially created in the seminal 1980 case of Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.137 Although the
second part of the test, which requires that “the asserted governmental
interest is substantial,”138 is sometimes evaluated at a fairly high level of
generality, as is often the case in heightened scrutiny formulations, the
third part of the test, “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted,”139 has increasingly been interpreted by
the Court to require rather precise evidentiary standards.
In the early years after the creation of the Central Hudson test, the
Court was sometimes less than rigorous in applying the test. The 1986
decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico,140 for example, the Court upheld a restriction on ads for casino

134. Emily Erickson, Disfavored Advertising: Telemarketing, Junk Faxes and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 589, 602 (2006) (“[T]he broader
trend has been one of higher scrutiny for commercial speech cases.”).
135. As one federal appellate court opined in a 2009 commercial speech case,
“[W]e do not simply defer to defendant’s contention because it is a legislative judgment”
but instead “independently evaluate” the government’s assertions. W. Va. Ass’n Club
Owners & Fraternal Serv., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 2009).
136. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the intermediate scrutiny
standard of judicial review, “[a] content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the
First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the
suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary
to further those interests.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
See Capobianco v. Summers, 377 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 2004) (referring to the Central
Hudson test as “the intermediate scrutiny test”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63
F.3d 1305, 1313 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The Supreme Court has characterized the review of
commercial speech regulation as one of intermediate scrutiny.”).
137. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
138. Id. at 566.
139. Id.
140. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). Among other conclusions highly criticized by constitutional
scholars, the Posadas majority suggested that “the greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”
Id. at 345–46. This “greater includes the lesser” formulation, which seemed incomprehensible to
many First Amendment scholars, was eventually repudiated by the Court. See, e.g., Phillip B.
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gambling aimed at Puerto Rican residents rather than at tourists. The
regulation was designed to achieve the rather delicate balance of
encouraging tourists to drop a few dollars at the craps table and depart
the jurisdiction forthwith, while not persuading locals to engage in
gambling, with all its attendant social ills.141
In considering the issue of whether the advertising regulation directly
advanced the state’s interest in preventing excessive gambling among
local residents, part three of the Central Hudson test, the majority’s
analysis was surprising:
The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising
restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the
residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product
advertised. We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one, and the fact
appellant has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that
appellant shares the legislature’s view.142

This was a rather stunning brand of legal jujitsu that used the First
Amendment speaker’s very presence in court against it. As one treatise
put it, “[S]ince the person whose speech is banned has brought the case
before the Supreme Court, the ban likely passes the third part of the test.
‘Catch-22,’ precisely.”143 There is a complete absence of any independent
assessment by the Court, either as to the actual harm or the regulatory
mode chosen to address it. Professors Michael Hoefges and Milagros
Rivera-Sanchez wrote that Posadas embraced a “highly deferential
application of the direct-advancement inquiry under the third Central
Hudson factor.”144 They added:
To this day, the Posadas opinion stands as perhaps the Court’s most lenient
application of intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson analysis. The
majority deferred without question to Puerto Rico’s asserted regulatory interests
and, more importantly, blindly assumed that regulation of gambling advertising

Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: “‘Twas Strange, ‘Twas Passing
Strange; ‘Twas Pitiful, ‘Twas Wondrous Pitiful,” 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13.
141. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
142. Id. at 341–42.
143. P. CAMERON DEVORE & ROBERT D. SACK, ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE 4-22 (1999).
144. Michael Hoefges & Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the
Supreme Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central Hudson Analysis,
22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 361–62 (2000).
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would be effective in curing potentially harmful secondary effects of gambling
related to behavior.145

As the Court developed its commercial speech jurisprudence, however,
it increasingly applied a more rigorous standard to the directadvancement part of the Central Hudson test. In Edenfield v. Fane,146
the Court in 1993 considered a challenge to a Florida Board of Accountancy
rule that forbade direct solicitation of clients by Certified Public
Accountants (CPA). The Board based its defense of the rule on its
interest in preventing fraud and protecting potential clients’ privacy, as
well as protecting “the fact and appearance of CPA independence and to
guard against conflicts of interest.”147
Although the Court acknowledged the substantiality of these interests
“in the abstract,”148 it saved the rigorous examination for the third prong
of the test, requiring solid proof that the solicitation ban served those
interests.149 On the latter point, the Court specifically noted that “[t]his
burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain such a restriction . . . must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”150 Close observers of the
Supreme Court will recall that this same language was cited favorably in
2002 by Justice David Souter in another First Amendment area in which
intermediate scrutiny is employed, namely the zoning of adult bookstores.151
This stands in stark contrast, of course, to the High Court’s analysis in
both Pacifica Foundation and Fox Television Stations, in which there
was no demonstration by any evidence that the harms suffered by
children from hearing indecent speech are real.152 In Edenfield, the Court
found that the government failed to meet this standard. The Board had
failed, the Court noted, to submit any studies indicating that CPA
solicitation of clients created dangers of lack of independence, fraud, or
the like.153 Nor did the Board offer anecdotal evidence of such outcomes

145. Id. at 361 (emphasis omitted).
146. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
147. Id. at 769.
148. Id. at 770.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 770–71 (emphasis added).
151. See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 458 n.3 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter went on to stress the dangers of “an uncritical common sense”
and to write that “we must be careful about substituting common assumptions for evidence.”
Id. at 459.
152. Supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
153. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.
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from in-person solicitation of clients. The Court also pointed out that
some of the evidence presented by the Board actually contradicted,
rather than supported, its contentions.154 This requirement of empirical
evidence put forward by the party seeking to suppress the speech is
light-years from Posadas’ catch-22 methodology.
The Court deviated somewhat from this data-driven trajectory in
1995’s Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.155 In that case, the Court upheld
a Florida Bar rule imposing a thirty-day restriction on attorney directmail solicitation of accident or disaster victims or their families.156 The
Florida Bar justified its rule with a study that included examples of
citizens outraged by solicitation letters they had received in the wake of
tragedies.157 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion defended
the conclusion that “direct-mail solicitation in the immediate aftermath
of accidents . . . targets a concrete, non-speculative harm,”158 even
though Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent suggested that the specifics
of the Bar’s study were lacking.
Justice Kennedy wrote that the study “includes no actual surveys, few
indications of sample size or selection procedure, no explanations of
methodology, and no discussion of excluded results. There is no
description of the statistical universe or scientific framework that permits
any productive use of the information.”159 Justice Kennedy seemed to be
taking the position that if the government wished to have its evidence
treated with the respect due to empirical inquiry, it needed to observe the
niceties associated with such research.
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion rejected these concerns, noting
that “we do not read our case law to require that empirical data come to
us accompanied by a surfeit of background information.”160 The very
fact that the two opinions were arguing about the interpretation of
empirical data, in any event, was a major step forward.
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,161 decided in 1996, the Court
continued to emphasize these themes. Although 44 Liquormart was

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 772.
515 U.S. 618 (1995).
Id. at 620.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 628–29.
Id. at 640 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628 (majority opinion).
517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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notable for Justice Thomas’s call to repudiate the Central Hudson test in
at least some advertising situations,162 the Court’s other members chose
instead to focus on an increasingly rigorous analysis. 44 Liquormart
arose when the State of Rhode Island attempted to prohibit price
advertising for alcoholic beverages other than at the point of sale.
Justice John Paul Stevens’s plurality opinion emphasized that Rhode
Island had presented no evidence that its regulation would maintain
higher alcohol prices in the state and thereby promote temperance, thus
meeting the third prong of Central Hudson. Justice Stevens wrote that
“[a]lthough the record suggests that the price advertising ban may have
some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of modest
means, . . . the State has presented no evidence to suggest that its speech
prohibition will significantly reduce marketwide consumption.”163
In its 2001 opinion in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,164 the Court
reiterated the three principles on the direct-advancement prong: (1) the
harms the government asserts are real; (2) mere speculation and
conjecture will not satisfy the government’s evidentiary burden of showing
regulations will cure those harms; and (3) empirical data accompanied
by a surfeit of background information is not required, however, to meet
that burden.165
In Lorillard, the Massachusetts Attorney General offered into evidence
numerous studies to demonstrate that minors actually are harmed by
certain tobacco products that were reviewed by the Court, with Justice
O’Connor concluding for the majority:
Our review of the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided ample
documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and
cigars. . . . On this record and in the posture of summary judgment, we are
unable to conclude that the Attorney General’s decision to regulate advertising

162. “In my view, the Central Hudson test asks the courts to weigh
incommensurables—the value of knowledge versus the value of ignorance—and to apply
contradictory premises—that informed adults are the best judges of their own interests,
and that they are not.” Id. at 528 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
163. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). As if to indicate how far this
analysis had evolved since the primitive Posadas, Justice Stevens pointed out in a
footnote that even though the law’s challengers had stipulated that they believed alcohol
sales would go up if the law were repealed, that belief only indicated that they could compete
more effectively without the ad ban, not that “they believe either the number of alcohol
consumers, the number of purchases by those consumers, will increase in the ban’s
absence.” Id. at 506 n.16.
164. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
165. Id. at 555.
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of smokeless tobacco and cigars in an effort to combat the use of tobacco
products by minors was based on mere “speculation [and] conjecture.”166

In other words, the government proved, through documented evidence
present on the record, that there was actually harm that needed to be
remedied. It is important to understand that such scrutiny on the third
prong of Central Hudson, requiring some level of documentation beyond
mere speculation and conjecture, takes place despite the fact that
commercial speech is treated as “second class”167 expression and is not
provided with the same safeguards as other types of expression, such as
political speech,168 which is subject to the heightened strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review.169 The bottom line is that while the FCC gets
a free pass on issues of harm allegedly caused by indecency, government
entities seeking to regulate commercial speech simply cannot pass
constitutional muster “without any findings of fact, or indeed any
evidentiary support whatsoever.”170
At this point, then, the judicial inconsistency related to issues of
causation of harm becomes even clearer. Laws targeting violent video
games are subject to exacting scrutiny on the causation of harm issue,171
while laws targeting commercial speech require less evidence but
nonetheless demand that “a governmental body . . . must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree.”172 But when it comes to indecency,
the FCC apparently carries no such burden whatsoever, either because the
Justices believe that no empirical evidence can be marshaled or because
they believe that commonsense and their own intuition is sufficient.
166. Id. at 561 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
167. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 151 (2d ed. 2003).
168. See Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial
Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007)
(“[T]he commercial speech doctrine creates a category of speech subject to intermediate
scrutiny under the First Amendment.”).
169. As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “[w]hen a law burdens core political
speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 347 (1995). See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197–98 n.3 (1992) (“[A]
content-based regulation of political speech in a public forum is valid only if it can
survive strict scrutiny.”).
170. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996).
171. See supra Part III.A (discussing commercial speech).
172. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (emphasis added).
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C. Trademark Dilution
This Article turns now to a relatively new branch of communications
law—at the federal level, at least—in which empiricism appears to be
inchoate. Trademark dilution law generally does not require the same
degree of empirical validation of harm as does commercial speech.173
Although trademark dilution is not based on the First Amendment,174 as
are other legal areas explored in this Article, it is nonetheless apposite
because its prime focus is the effect of a particular trademark or service
mark on the public and the resultant harm to the plaintiff, generally the
owner of a famous trademark alleging dilution. The offending mark in a
trademark dilution case is no less a “media message” than is indecent
speech or commercial advertising, and a judicial determination of the
message’s harm is no less complex or appropriate for empirical
investigation.
Federal trademark dilution law is a relatively recent addition to a
famous trademark owner’s armament at the federal level. Dilution law,
which already existed in a number of states,175 became effective at the
federal level in 1996 through the passage of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA).176 The FTDA was important in that it provided
owners of famous marks with much greater control over their marks than
standard trademark infringement law, which relies upon consumer
confusion as the basis of the harm.177
Dilution, on the contrary, was premised on the idea that, even absent
consumer confusion, similar marks could cause harm by the “gradual
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public

173. See supra Part III.A (discussing commercial speech).
174. Trademark law generally is a branch of the common law of unfair competition.
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916), superseded by statute,
Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 433, as recognized in Park ‘n Fly v.
Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
175. Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995: You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby—Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 133,
140–42 (1997).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). The act has since been amended by the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). The Trademark
Dilution Revision Act, among other things, made it clear that liability can be established
with a showing of a mere likelihood of dilution, rather than the actual dilution standard
the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418
(2003), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub L. No.
109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
177. RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW
1-1 (1995).
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mind of the mark or name.”178 Dilution, even done by a noncompetitor
and thus causing no confusion among the public, can reduce the
distinctiveness of a famous mark and thus its ability to identify a specific
product or service. Dilution is thought of as a long-term harm to the
semiotic value of the mark; as a House report on the federal dilution act
noted: “Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an
infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising
value of the mark.”179
The U.S. Supreme Court’s first major assessment of federal dilution
law, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,180 was cryptic on the place of
empirical evidence of harm to the trademark owner. In Moseley, the
owner of the Victoria’s Secret trademark sued a Kentucky adult novelty
store operating as “Victor’s Secret.”181 Although the retailer, after receiving
threats of litigation, changed its name to “Victor’s Little Secret,” the
trademark owner nonetheless filed suit for a number of claims, including
dilution under federal law.182 In reversing a Sixth Circuit decision that
injunctive relief for dilution was appropriate, the Supreme Court held
that injunctive relief under the statute required a showing of actual
dilution rather than a likelihood of dilution.183
The Court’s discussion of how to determine whether dilution has
taken place suggested a standard significantly lacking empirical rigor.
Apparently accepting Victoria’s Secret’s assertion that “consumer surveys
and other means of demonstrating actual dilution are expensive and often
unreliable,”184 the Court offered a weak and somewhat ambiguous
account of what the required proof might be. Although the Court made
it clear that “consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or

178. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 825 (1927). Schechter is generally regarded as the key originator of U.S.
dilution law. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:67 (2009).
179. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995) (quoted in Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427).
180. 537 U.S. 418.
181. Id. at 423.
182. Id. at 423–24.
183. Id. at 433. As noted above, the actual dilution standard was overturned by the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, supra note 176. There would appear to be no
reason to assume, however, that the Court’s attitude toward empirical evidence would be
markedly different under a likelihood of dilution standard.
184. Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
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profits,”185 need not be proved, it appeared to offer little other guidance
as to what sort of proof might be acceptable. As the Court put it, “It may
well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer
surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved
through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the
junior and senior marks are identical.”186
The Court provided no explanation as to what sort of circumstantial
evidence would be sufficient. Nor did it offer any justification for its
apparent skepticism about the reliability of survey research.187 Since the
Court’s decision, the federal statute has been amended to make clear that
the law requires only a likelihood of dilution, rather than actual,
accomplished dilution.188 It would seem, however, that whether the
required showing is actual dilution or a mere likelihood of dilution,
empirical evidence as to the effect of the offending mark would be
enormously helpful, if not necessary, to demonstrate as opaque an effect
as dilution.189 In fact, a likelihood of dilution standard is, if anything, a
more elusive concept given that it seeks to predict future dilution rather
than identifying dilution that has already taken place.
Dilution by blurring, for example, which requires that the offending
mark “whittle away” the power of the plaintiff’s mark to identify a
product in the mind of a consumer, is a tremendously subtle concept.190
As trademark scholar J. Thomas McCarthy put it:
How could there be any “whittling away” if the buyer, upon seeing defendant’s
mark, would never, even unconsciously, think of the plaintiff’s mark? For
example, if the person who sees the hypothetical ALBERT FORD brand hiking

185. Id. at 433.
186. Id. at 434.
187. A number of commentators have taken issue with the Court’s understanding of
survey research. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker et al., Proving Dilution: Survey Evidence
in Trademark Dilution Actions, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37 (2004).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
189. Judge Richard Posner gave an unusually clear account of dilution by blurring
that also points toward the empirical difficulties of establishing it:
Suppose an upscale restaurant calls itself “Tiffany.” There is little danger that
the consuming public will think it’s dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry
store if it patronizes this restaurant. But when consumers next see the name
“Tiffany” they may think about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if
so the efficacy of the name as an identifier of the store will be diminished.
Consumers will have to think harder—incur as it were a higher imagination
cost—to recognize the name as the name of the store.
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
190. The current statute defines dilution by blurring as “association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006).
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boots would not even think of FORD autos, then there is no dilution. This
could be proven in court only by a consumer survey.191

Dilution by tarnishment, which the revised federal act made clear is a
covered injury to a famous mark owner, has been defined as “association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”192 This sort of
reputational harm would also seem to require significant empirical support
to prove.
Scholars have offered a variety of suggested approaches for proving
dilution, whether actual or likely. One study, for example, suggested that
“the most authoritative evidence will require a comparison of surveys
administered to a sample of consumers unexposed to the junior party’s use
and surveys administered to an exposed sample. Through this comparison,
a plaintiff can demonstrate that a mark has been diluted from some
benchmark figure.”193 Other commentators have advocated a randomized
experiment to prove dilution.194 One commentator has challenged current
methods of assessing dilution because consumers’ very awareness they
are participating in some sort of marketing study may significantly affect
their responses: “Because dilution claims center on affect and association
rather than on specific factual claims, dilution surveys are particularly
vulnerable to . . . observation-induced distortions.”195
Whatever the empirical difficulties in establishing as elusive a fact as
dilution or the likelihood thereof, courts have barely begun even to
grapple with the issues. Thus, dilution law leaves courts with a substantial
zone of speculation about possible harms caused by supposedly offending
junior marks.
In summary, this Part has demonstrated judicial inconsistency when it
comes to establishing causation of harm from speech. This incoherence
muddles First Amendment jurisprudence, as courts vary widely in the

191. J. Thomas McCarthy, The 1996 Federal Anti-Dilution Statute, 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 587, 593 (1998).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006).
193. Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence To Show Actual Dilution, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 295, 331 (1999).
194. Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of
Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 34–38 (2006).
195. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 545 (2008).
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need to demonstrate proof of causation depending upon the nature of the
speech in question.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a 2004 article, Professor Wilson Huhn argued that “[i]n recent
freedom of expression cases, the [Supreme] Court is increasingly turning
its attention to the quality and quantity of proof of the causal link
between speech and harm.”196 In partial support of this contention, he cited
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s assertion in 1994 from Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC197:
When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to redress
past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply “posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured.” . . . It must demonstrate that the
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.198

To buttress this logic, Justice Kennedy referenced the High Court’s
decision the prior year in Edenfield v. Fane,199 discussed earlier in this
article,200 in which it had opined, in the context of the commercial speech
doctrine, that government entities “must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.”201 But this line of reasoning, and what Professor Huhn
just six years ago called “the recent trend towards empiricism”202 in
speech cases, was rudely interrupted in 2009 by Fox Television Stations.
Justice Scalia’s assertion that “[t]here are some propositions for which
scant empirical evidence can be marshaled”203 creates the potential for
what might be thought of as a harm causation gap. In particular, when a
judge or court makes the determination that such evidence cannot be
marshaled on any given speech-harm proposition, then there is a
evidentiary gap created on the causation question. The chasm often is
filled by jurists’ suppositions and assumptions about media messages
and how communication processes work, as Justice Scalia’s own

196. Wilson Huhn, Scienter, Causation, and Harm in Freedom of Expression Analysis:
The Right Hand Side of the Constitutional Calculus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 125,
197 (2004).
197. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
198. Id. at 664 (citation omitted).
199. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
200. Supra Part III.B.
201. Edenfeld, 507 U.S. at 770–71.
202. Huhn, supra note 196, at 201.
203. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
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statements indicate.204 It also may be crowded with their own off handed
anecdotal evidence in an area of speech-harm causation in which
psychologists, communication scholars, and linguists might be better
situated to address the issue. Indeed, as Professor Anthony Fargo has
observed, “the uses of empirical data to inform judicial decisions about
free-speech rights are scant, at least at the appellate level.”205
In contrast, when a judge or justice determines that empirical evidence
can be marshaled, then a much more exacting, even painstaking, analysis
of the social science evidence takes place, as is the case with laws
targeting violent video games.206 This, in turn, greatly affects whether the
law survives constitutional muster, as violent video game laws uniformly
are struck down,207 in part, because the social science evidence cannot
prove an actual harm sustained by minors that is caused by playing the
games. In fact, as Professor Robert H. Wood recently asserted:
Until there are scientific studies demonstrating such a causal link, the efforts
of state governments to regulate violent video games will meet the same fate as
the ones that have gone before. Until that point, legislators will be merely beating
their heads against the judicial wall, which has actually been shown to cause
headaches, and has resulted in awards of attorney fees against some of the states
that have sought to restrict video games.208

If there really is no social science evidence indicating that fleeting
expletives on television cause harm to children209 and if the courts are
not demanding such evidence, then are courts censoring speech due to
phantom fears of harm to minors? Twenty-five years ago, Professor
Donald E. Lively cogently observed that “[t]he history of restricting
freedom of expression to ease social discomfort teaches that fear of
potential evil is a treacherous basis for control and, in the absence of

204. Id.
205. Anthony L. Fargo, Social Science Research in Judges’ First Amendment Decisions,
in COMMUNICATION AND LAW: MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO RESEARCH 23, 24
(Amy Reynolds & Brooke Barnett eds., 2006).
206. See supra Part III.A.
207. Robert H. Wood, Violent Video Games: More Ink Spilled than Blood—An
Analysis of the 9th Circuit Decision in Video Software Dealers Association v. Schwarzenegger,
10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 103, 114 (2009) (analyzing violent video game case law
and observing that “none of the legislative efforts have survived constitutional scrutiny
despite the different approaches that have been attempted”).
208. Id. at 115.
209. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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strict constitutional standards, a potent chilling force.”210 He adds that
“[m]uch energy is wasted, and enormous constitutional damage done, by
focusing on differences that are inconsequential and evil that is not
demonstrated.”211 Despite the cautioning words of Justice Louis D.
Brandeis more than eighty years ago that “[f]ear of serious injury cannot
alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly,”212 and that
“[m]en feared witches and burnt women,”213 when children are put into
the mix, the fear factor, as it were, seemingly is ratcheted up.
During a 1997 panel discussion on children, media, and the law, George
Washington University Law School Professor Catherine J. Ross remarked:
The contemporary anxiety about the nexus between child development and popular
culture, whether it’s rock lyrics, TV or the Internet, is sometimes couched in the
secular language of the social sciences and sometimes in overt religious concern
about morality. But in each instance, the underlying concern invests a great deal
in an image of childhood that does not always conform to social realities.214

This article has attempted to point out that the “social realities”215 of
precisely how children might be affected by the use of fleeting expletives
are much more complex that Justice Scalia acknowledges when he
graciously provides the FCC with a pass on the causation question.
Perhaps this pass really was given not so much because there is no
scholarly literature on expletives, swearing, and profanity—to the
contrary, more than twenty different books and articles on these topics
are cited in Part II of this Article216—but because the target of the
alleged harm was children.
It is impossible to know, of course, precisely how much of Justice
Scalia’s decision on causation might have been based on the none-toosubtle fact that the alleged victims of whatever harm fleeting expletives
might cause were minors. As Yale Law School Professor Jack Balkin
writes, we often
turn to children as the master trope, the perspective through which we can talk
about cultural control, while at the same time professing our respect for freedom
of speech. Because children have fewer first amendment rights than adults,

210. Donald E. Lively, Fear and the Media: A First Amendment Horror Show, 69
MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1095 (1985).
211. Id. at 1097.
212. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., Section on Mass Commc’ns Law, 1997 Annual
Conference Panel: Sex, Violence, Children and the Media: Legal, Historical and Empirical
Perspectives, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 341, 351 (1997) (quoting Catherine J. Ross).
215. Id.
216. Supra Part II.A (including more than twenty such citations).
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because children need to be protected, shaped, educated, and so on, and because
children are the future of our culture, we can reconcile our conflicting desires by
viewing all cultural issues in terms of children and their interests and needs.217

The question becomes does the legal system, be it Congress or federal
agencies or courts, in latent and even unacknowledged fashion, subtly
embrace different evidentiary standards when minors are the focus of the
harm? The obvious answer, as demonstrated in Part III, Section A, is
not always and, in particular, not when it comes to the rash of relatively
recent laws designed to shield minors from violent video games.218 But
Pacifica Foundation was built more than thirty years ago on mere
assumptions of harm,219 and now Fox Television Stations is following
that same path. How, then, can one explain the discrepancy between the
causation free pass given to the FCC by Justice Scalia for regulating
fleeting evidences but not for violent video game laws that have been
closely scrutinized by federal courts across the nation?
A possibly disturbing answer, although it is not clear whether this is
what Justice Scalia intended, is that the level of scrutiny on the causation
question will vary, depending upon the nature of the government entity
that adopts and enforces the policy or regulation. In the case of indecency,
it was a federal agency that had been vested with delegated statutory
authority from Congress to regulate indecency.220 Do regulations created

217. Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., Section on Mass Commc’ns Law, supra note 214, at
353 (quoting Jack Balkin).
218. See supra Part III.A (addressing how courts have considered the question of
harm allegedly caused by violent video games).
219. For instance, Justice Louis Powell wrote, without citing a shred of evidence to
support his view, that
children may not be able to protect themselves from speech which, although
shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling through the
exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and
more lasting negative effect on a child than on an adult.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757–58 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). He failed to specify what this negative effect was. Justice Powell added that the
FCC “properly held that the speech from which society may attempt to shield its children
is not limited to that which appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language involved in
this case is as potentially degrading and harmful to children as representations of many
erotic acts.” Id. at 758 (emphasis added). Once again, Justice Powell failed to specify
what this harm is.
220. As the Federal Communications Commission states on its website, “[i]t is a
violation of federal law to air obscene programming at any time. It is also a violation of
federal law to air indecent programming or profane language during certain hours.
Congress has given the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the responsibility
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by federal agencies that supposedly have expertise in certain areas receive
greater deference on the causation issue than those adopted by nonagency
general legislative bodies, such as the State of California or County of
St. Louis, Missouri, both of which adopted laws targeting violent video
games that were rigorously scrutinized?221 This would seem to be a
perversion of First Amendment protection for expression by making the
constitutionality of a regulation turn, at least in part, on the nature of the
entity that adopted it.
Although much of this Article has argued for empirical rigor in
judicial determinations of the harm allegedly caused by media messages,
some words of caution about the limits of empiricism are essential.
Although a jurisprudence leavened with an empirical attitude has much
to recommend it, there indeed can be too much of a good thing. As
Professor Timothy Zick put it, “[D]etailed consideration of empirical
evidence should not be allowed to displace more normative and robust
constitutional discourse.”222 Professor Zick worries that courts may
allow empirical data to short-circuit the adjudicative process, leading to
just another sterile brand of constitutional formalism: “More and more, it
is a calculation, rather than a constitution, that is being expounded.”223
Empirical data must only be the beginning, not the end, particularly in
determinations affecting the scope of First Amendment rights. Even
armed with reliable studies suggesting the harm caused by particular
media messages, for example, courts must nonetheless reflect deeply
about whether such harms justify overriding important First Amendment
values because statistical significance certainly is not equivalent to
constitutional significance.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court now has a propitious
opportunity to resolve at least some of the issues surrounding causation
harm. In April 2010, it granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
violent video game case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n.224 One of the two questions it will consider during the 2010–2011
term in Schwarzenegger is whether a state is required to demonstrate a
direct causal link between violent video games and physical and
psychological harm to minors before it can prohibit the sale of the games
for administratively enforcing these laws.” Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Consumer
Facts: Obscene, Indecent, and Profane Broadcasts, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumer
facts/obscene.html (last visited July 25, 2010) (emphasis added) (bold omitted).
221. See supra Part III.A (regarding violent video game laws).
222. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles
and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 220 (2003).
223. Id.
224. 78 U.S.L.W. 3627 (U.S. Apr. 26, 2010) (No. 08-1448).
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to minors.225 As discussed earlier in this Article,226 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2009 had declared unconstitutional the
California law at the center of the case.227 How the Court resolves this
issue remains to be seen, but perhaps its opinion will add some clarity
that will begin to extricate the Court and other judicial bodies from the
causation quagmire.

225. Questions Presented, Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchant, No. 081448, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/08-01
448qp.pdf (last visited July 25, 2010).
226. Supra Part III.A.
227. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.
2009).
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